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Letter dated 5 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon the instructions of my Government, I transmit herewith for your attention the record of the ceasefire violations by the Azerbaijani armed forces along the state border of the Republic of Armenia during the month of September 2017 (see annex I).**

I also transmit herewith for your attention the record of the ceasefire violations registered by the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh Republic) during the month of September 2017 (see annex II).**

I kindly request that the present letter and its annexes be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 34, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Zohrab **Mnatsakanyan**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* Reissued for technical reasons on 16 October 2017.
** Circulated in the language of submission only.

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Annex I to the letter dated 5 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan along the State border with the Republic of Armenia

1-30 September 2017

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
1 September	Tavush Region	19	Small arms and light weapons: 247
	Chinari	5	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 74
	Aygedzor	6	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 34 (Aygedzor)
	Aygepar	3	Large-calibre machine guns: 30
	Movses	4	
	N. Karmiraghbyur	1	
2 September	Tavush, Gegharkunik Regions	5	Small arms and light weapons: 138
	Jil	2	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 25 (Jil 25)
	Pambak	1	
	Aygepar	2	
3 September	Tavush, Gegharkunik Regions	3	Small arms and light weapons: 65
	Jil	2	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 25
	Mehrab	1	
4 September	Tavush, Gegharkunik Regions	5	Small arms and light weapons: 210
	Aygepar	1	
	Movses	1	
	Jil	2	
	Pambak	1	
5 September	Tavush, Gegharkunik Regions	3	Small arms and light weapons: 3
	Aygepar	2	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 2
	Chambarak	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 25
6 September	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Syunik, Vayots Dzor Regions	12	Small arms and light weapons: 92
			Small-calibre sniper weapons: 6
	Chapni	3	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 12 (Chapni 5; Jil 7)
	Jil	2	Large-calibre machine guns: 380
	Vahan	1	Small-calibre mortars: 2
	Chinari	1	
	Paravakar	2	
	Kayanavan	1	
	Bardzruni	1	
	Khachik	1	
7 September	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Ararat Regions	13	Small arms and light weapons: 750
	Pambak	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 8 (Gyunashli 8)
	Vahan	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 280
	Gyunashli	3	
	Chambarak	1	

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
	Jil	2	
	Aygepar	3	
	Eraskh	1	
	Shaghat	1	
8 September	Tavush, Gegharkunik Regions	14	Small arms and light weapons: 162
	Jil	2	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 7
	Vahan	2	Large-calibre machine guns: 95
	Paravakar	3	
	Aygepar	1	
	Vazashen	2	
	Sarigyugh	1	
	Kayanavan	1	
	Sevqar	1	
	Barekamavan	1	
9 September	Tavush, Gegharkunik Regions	8	Small arms and light weapons: 118
	Daranak	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 5
	Mehrab	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 15 (Daranak)
	Paravaqar	2	
	Vazashen	1	
	Aygehovit	1	
	Kayanavan	2	
10 September	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Ararat Regions	6	Small arms and light weapons: 1,514
	Jil	2	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 3
	Kakhakn	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 1 (Kakhakan 1)
	Chinari	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 15
	Eraskh	1	
	Vazashen	1	
11 September	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Syunik Regions	8	Small arms and light weapons: 705
	Jil	2	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 16
	Kakhakn	2	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 30
	Aygedzor	1	
	Mehrab	1	
	Aygepar	1	
	Shaghat	1	
12 September	Tavush, Gegharkunik Regions	7	Small arms and light weapons: 185
	Chapni	3	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 31
	Tsapatagh	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 35
	Aygedzor	2	
	Paravaqar	1	
13 September	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Vayots Dzor, Syunik Regions	5	Small arms and light weapons: 43
			Small-calibre sniper weapons: 13
	Aygedzor	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 5 (Agarak)
	Martiros	1	

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
	Vazashen	1	
	Agarak	2	
14 September	Tavush, Gegharkunik Regions	4	Small arms and light weapons: 166
	Chinari	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 8
	Jil	1	
	Aygepar	2	
15 September	Tavush Region	9	Small arms and light weapons: 598
	Mehrab	3	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 170
	Chinari	4	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 8 (Chapni 3; Movses 5)
	Aygedzor	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 40
	Movses	1	
16 September	Tavush, Ararat, Gegharkunik, Syunik Regions	4	Small arms and light weapons: 171
	Mehrab	1	
	Movses	2	
	Khachik	1	
17 September	Tavush Region	3	Small arms and light weapons: 12
	Chinari	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 1
	Movses	1	
	Vazashen	1	
18 September	Tavush, Vayots Dzor, Ararat Regions	4	Small arms and light weapons: 89
	Jil	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 13
	Chinari	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 10 (Jil)
	Vazashen	1	
	Eraskh	1	
19 September	Tavush Region	2	Small arms and light weapons: 11
	Movses	1	
	Vazashen	1	
20 September	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Vayots Dzor Regions	4	Small arms and light weapons: 18 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 5 (Jil)
	Jil	2	
	Aygepar	1	
	Khndzorut	1	
21 September	Tavush, Gegharkunik Regions	4	Small arms and light weapons: 14
	Chinari	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 1
	Shaghat	3	
22 September	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Syunik Regions	4	Small arms and light weapons: 47
	Jil	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 5
	Avazan	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 2 (Agarak)
	Chinari	1	
	Agarak	1	

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
23 September	Tavush Region	2	Small arms and light weapons: 70
	Vahan	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 3 (Aygedzor)
	Aygedzor	1	
24 September	Tavush, Gegharkunik Regions	4	Small arms and light weapons: 23
	Jil	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 5
	Aygepar	1	
	Nerkin Karmiraghbyur	1	
	Berkaber	1	
25 September	Tavush, Gegharkunik Regions	3	Small arms and light weapons: 42
	Chinari	2	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 20
	Jil	1	
26 September	Tavush, Gegharkunik Regions	2	Small arms and light weapons: 7
	Jil	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 50
	Chambarak	1	
27 September	Tavush, Vayots Dzor, Gegharkunik Regions	11	Small arms and light weapons: 92
			Small-calibre sniper weapons: 5
	Jil	3	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 4 (Tsapatagk)
	Tsapatagh	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 15
	Kutakan	1	
	Aygedzor	1	
	Chinari	1	
	Paravakar	1	
	Vazashen	1	
	Koti	1	
	Bardzruni	1	
28 September	Tavush Region	2	Small arms and light weapons: 21
	Aygedzor	1	
	Paravakar	1	
29 September	Tavush Region	17	Small arms and light weapons: 419
	Mehrab	4	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 75
	Paravakar	3	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 14 (Koti)
	Aygepar	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 10
	Kayanavan	1	
	Berkaber	4	
	Koti	2	
	Baghanis	1	
	Barekamavan	1	
30 September	Tavush Region	2	Small arms and light weapons: 10
	Aygehovit	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 5
	Baghanis	1	

Annex II to the letter dated 5 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the line of contact with the Republic of Artsakh (Nagorno Karabakh Republic)

1-30 September 2017

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
1 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	17	Small arms and light weapons: 171 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 5 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 13 (Mehdili 1; Gjulistan 12) Large-calibre machine guns: 14
2 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	24	Small arms and light weapons: 195 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 16
3 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	23	Small arms and light weapons: 338 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 7 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 1 (Ashaghi Veysali)
4 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	13	Small arms and light weapons: 177 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 18 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 21 (Mehdili)
5 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	14	Small arms and light weapons: 233 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 7 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 16 (Shikhlyar 6; Gjulistan 10)
6 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	17	Small arms and light weapons: 177 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 9 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 20 (Gjulistan) Large-calibre machine guns: 36
7 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	19	Small arms and light weapons: 582 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 15 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 1 (Talish)
8 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	15	Small arms and light weapons: 259 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 20 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 7 (Ashaghi Seydakhmedli) Large-calibre machine guns: 4
9 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	17	Small arms and light weapons: 472 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 23 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 18 (Gjulistan) Large-calibre machine guns: 25
10 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	15	Small arms and light weapons: 160 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 6 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 6 (Mehdili)

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
11 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	11	Small arms and light weapons: 100 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 9 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 1 (Ashaghi Seydakhmedli)
12 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	29	Small arms and light weapons: 211 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 3 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 5 (Ashaghi Abdurakhmanli) Grenade launchers: 1
13 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	21	Small arms and light weapons: 307 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 3 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 9 (Gjulistan)
14 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	21	Small arms and light weapons: 271 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 4 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 17 (Gjulistan 10; Mehdili 7)
15 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	17	Small arms and light weapons: 167 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 4 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 28 (Gjulistan 8; Seysulan 20)
16 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	11	Small arms and light weapons: 124 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 5 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 25 (Gjulistan 15; Shikhlyar 10) Large-calibre machine guns: 15
17 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	20	Small arms and light weapons: 284 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 32
18 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	32	Small arms and light weapons: 458 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 22 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 3
19 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	14	Small arms and light weapons: 694 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 19 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 25 (Shikhlyar)
20 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	23	Small arms and light weapons: 292 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 9 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 23 (Mehdili 15; Ashaghi Seydakhmedli 1; Gjulistan 7) Large-calibre machine guns: 40
21 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	22	Small arms and light weapons: 195 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 12 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 11 (Gjulistan)
22 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	42	Small arms and light weapons: 778 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 15 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 19 (Karachuk 1; Ashaghi Seydakhmedli 1; Korgan 2; Gyulistan 15) Large-calibre machine guns: 13 Grenade launchers: 15

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
23 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	29	Small arms and light weapons: 527 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 32 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 3 (Kengerli) Large-calibre machine guns: 20
24 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	24	Small arms and light weapons: 321 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 4 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 12 (Gjulistan 8; Marzili 1; Mehdili 3)
25 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	18	Small arms and light weapons: 194 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 1 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 20 (Gjulistan) Large-calibre machine guns: 4
26 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	20	Small arms and light weapons: 244 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 9 Large-calibre machine guns: 6
27 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	18	Small arms and light weapons: 460 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 17 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 1 (Mehdili)
28 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	11	Small arms and light weapons: 281 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 3
29 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	15	Small arms and light weapons: 289 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 11 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 3 (Ashaghi Abdurakhmanli) Large-calibre machine guns: 5
30 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	17	Small arms and light weapons: 236 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 12 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 13 (Ashaghi Abdurakhmanli 6; Ashaghi Seydakhmedli 7)

During the reporting period, 1 soldier of the Defence Army of Artsakh was killed and 2 soldiers were wounded from fire by Azerbaijani side.

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Letter dated 3 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Slovakia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

It is my honour to inform you that on 5 and 6 June 2017, Slovakia held a High-level Conference on the Role of Security Sector Reform in Sustaining Peace, with the support of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. The Conference gathered over 100 participants, as well as representatives of multilateral organizations, including among others, the United Nations, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the World Bank.

It is my pleasure to present to you the outcome document of the high-level event, which highlights the recommendations that emerged from the deliberations (see annex).

Please allow me to express our sincere gratitude and commend the dedicated work of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and its Security Sector Reform Unit. The Group of Friends of Security Sector Reform, co-chaired by Slovakia and South Africa, remains committed to supporting the United Nations in enhancing its role and approaches to security sector reform.

I should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter and its annex as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 34 (a), and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Michal **Mlynár**
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

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Annex to the letter dated 3 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Slovakia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

High-level Conference on the Role of Security Sector Reform in Sustaining Peace: Challenges and Opportunities

Outcome document

1. The High-level Conference on the Role of Security Sector Reform in Sustaining Peace: Challenges and Opportunities, was held on 5 and 6 June 2017, in Bratislava, Slovakia, with the support of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. The conference gathered over 100 participants, as well as representatives of multilateral organizations, including, among others, the United Nations, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the World Bank. The conference was opened by the Minister for Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Miroslav Lajčák, who stated that it was time to take stock of multilateral approaches to support for security sector reform against the backdrop of recent policy developments in the area of sustaining peace. Moreover, he highlighted that the timing of the conference was opportune given his recent appointment as president of the seventy-second session of the General Assembly.

2. The present outcome document incorporates key findings and recommendations from the high-level conference. The recommendations emerging from the conference, as well as from the High-level Dialogue on Global Experiences in Security Sector Reform, held in New York in May 2017, and notably the seminar on the nexus between security sector reform, conflict prevention and peace sustainment, co-hosted by Slovakia and South Africa, and the seminar on conflict prevention and peace sustainment on the African continent, co-hosted by Senegal and South Africa, will serve as input to relevant discussions at the seventy-second session of the General Assembly.

3. The conference had a specific focus on the sustaining peace agenda, which has emerged as a new approach to preventing the outbreak, continuation and recurrence of conflict. The concept recognizes that building peace should not be limited to post-conflict contexts, and that it requires collective efforts across the entire peace continuum. Participants recognized that the two interrelated agendas of sustaining peace and sustainable development (the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development) will have far-reaching implications for engagement by the United Nations in the areas of peace and security. While the primary responsibility for driving the efforts to sustain peace lies with national authorities, there are increasing calls to rethink the United Nations approach to supporting these efforts and that of the broader international community. In the spirit of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, cooperation with multilateral organizations is vital to support efforts to prevent the outbreak, escalation and recurrence of conflict.

4. Security sector reform plays an important role in contributing to peace sustainment. As reaffirmed in Security Council resolution 2151 (2014), "an effective, professional and accountable security sector without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law is the cornerstone of peace and sustainable development and is important for conflict prevention". The conference reviewed the extent to which multilateral organizations are effectively equipped to deliver support to security sector reform in a way that is able to contribute to sustaining peace. More specifically, the conference sought to examine the role

security sector reform plays across different policy areas related to the success of peace sustainment, in particular, conflict prevention, peacekeeping/stabilization, and sustainable development.

5. To this effect, the conference started with a high-level panel on the role of security sector reform in sustaining peace, which examined the implications of the new sustaining peace agenda for multilateral organizations. Moderated by Ambassador Thomas Guerber of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, the high-level panel included Ambassador Jerry Mathews Matjila, Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations, Ambassador Fodé Seck, Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations, Ambassador Lamberto Zannier, Secretary-General of OSCE, Alexander Zouev, Assistant Secretary-General for Rule of Law and Security Institutions, Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Ambassador Thomas Greminger, Deputy Director General, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation. The conference continued with three thematic sessions: a session on security sector reform and peacekeeping/stabilization, which reflected on whether the support of multilateral organizations for security sector reform is appropriately adapted to meet the needs of peacekeeping and stabilization contexts; a second thematic session focused on security sector reform and sustainable development, which examined the opportunities that the 2030 Agenda offers to revitalize international support to security sector reform; and a third thematic session that examined the linkages between security sector reform and prevention and, in particular, the important role that security sector reform can play in preventing violent conflict. A session on sustaining peace through security sector reform was conducted in a round-table format to bring together representatives of multilateral organizations to discuss the main findings emerging through the thematic sessions and to identify concrete recommendations that may be taken forward.

Role of security sector reform support in sustaining peace

6. During the high-level panel on the role of security sector reform in sustaining peace it was recognized that in order for security sector reform support to contribute to the broader objective of peace sustainment, security sector reform needs to be perceived as an integral component of broader institution-building efforts. Security sector reform support therefore needs to be linked to a proper governance framework and a national reform agenda based on a long-term vision. Moreover, it was noted that one of the commonalities between the 2030 Agenda and the sustaining peace agenda is that neither will work if they are not founded on the principle of inclusivity. From a security sector reform perspective, it was recognized that this requires enhanced understanding of the role that the security sector may play in reinforcing tensions among the very population it is meant to protect. Fundamentally, security sector reform needs to be approached as a political process that is inclusive of all national stakeholders.

7. In relation to the thematic session on security sector reform and peacekeeping/stabilization, it was recognized that given the reality that multilateral organizations are often engaged in the same contexts side-by-side, there is a need for predictability in terms of the type of support that each organization will cover. Time is often lost while each organization separately assesses security sector needs, maps what others are doing and identifies a division of labour. It was also highlighted that the broad challenges of peacekeeping are further compounded in so-called "stabilization" contexts, where armed violence is still ongoing and no peace agreement has been achieved.

8. It was noted that in order to strengthen the impact that security sector reform support can have in peacekeeping contexts, there is a need to better integrate security sector reform into broader planning processes and, in particular, to find the right balance between attending to pressing needs without disregarding important long-term goals in planning processes. It was also noted that there is a need to move beyond "train-and-equip" approaches to security assistance that promotes technical modernization while placing effective controls on the use of force. It was recognized that the type of support provided during early stages peacekeeping will have long-term effects on the extent to which security sector reform support will be sustainable.

9. In relation to the thematic session on security sector reform and sustainable development, it was underlined that security sector reform has a vital role to play in contributing to the achievement of Sustainable Development Goal 16, as well as to related goals, such as on gender equality, safer cities and reducing inequalities. Thus, to meet the commitments made in the Sustainable Development Goals, States will need to mainstream good governance, rule of law and respect for human rights throughout the security sector. It was recognized that the 2030 Agenda promotes the understanding that the governance of the security sector is a universal agenda.

10. It was recognized that while security sector reform has the potential to play an important role in advancing the 2030 Agenda, its effective usage as a tool for implementing the Sustainable Development Goals faces a number of challenges. For instance, it is a reality that the work of political, security and development actors in the area of security sector reform often remain siloed, thus limiting opportunities for developing the coherent long-term approaches to support called for in the Sustainable Development Goals. It was noted that there is a need to learn from approaches promoted by the development community for strengthening coordination, such as the "one vision, one plan" approach. In order to strengthen the ability of security sector reform to advance the 2030 Agenda, there is also a need to address a number of issues relating to the lack of comprehensive data to inform adequate analysis of security sector needs, as well as to track progress in reaching security sector governance objectives.

11. In relation to the thematic session on security sector reform and prevention, it was recognized that poor governance of the security sector and its role in committing, or failing to protect the population from, human rights abuses play a role in triggering or prolonging conflicts. It was also highlighted that security sector reform should be seen as a broader confidence-building measure. While security sector reform can contribute to prevention efforts, it was noted there have been few efforts to understand what this means and how it could be achieved. It is expected that the upcoming United Nations and World Bank study on prevention will shed light on how different tools and approaches can contribute to preventing violent conflicts.

12. It was noted that in order to strengthen the preventive effects of security sector reform support, it will be necessary to further reflect on how to build the resilience of the security sector to stand up to anti-democratic forces and to prevent violence from escalating. Security sector reform within the framework of prevention therefore requires strengthening the analysis of potential exclusion generated or maintained by the security sector, and identifying entry points for addressing the issue. Such action requires better understanding of the vulnerabilities of the security sector through appropriate assessments and analysis of conflict drivers. It will also require accepting the fundamentally political nature of security sector reform, through which important questions about power and exclusion and/or inclusion should be addressed at both the national and local levels.

Recommendations

13. A number of recommendations were identified during the conference for strengthening the role of multilateral organizations in security sector reform support as a contribution towards the broader goal of sustaining peace. The recommendations are presented below, grouped according to whether they are context-specific or cross-cutting.

Context-specific recommendations

(a) In the area of peacekeeping/stabilization, there is a need to reflect on what are the minimum standards for security sector reform support. It was noted that an increasing challenge in these contexts is the tendency for international actors to seek quick fixes through "train-and-equip" programmes that are not linked to broader governance objectives. This challenge is further compounded in stabilization contexts where the lack of political settlement and/or ongoing armed fighting makes support to reform efforts very difficult.

- It is recommended that international actors engaged in both stabilization and peacekeeping contexts ensure that "train-and-equip" approaches are not delivered without parallel efforts to strengthen the democratic governance of the security sector.

- It is recommended that international actors identify and prioritize what type of support may feasibly be provided in peacekeeping/stabilization contexts to build the foundations for future reform efforts.

(b) In the area of sustainable development, it was recognized that security sector reform should be seen as an accelerator for the 2030 Agenda. It was noted that the 2030 Agenda provides an important entry point for engaging Governments in dialogue on how to strengthen the governance of the security sector. It was acknowledged that more efforts need to be made to capitalize on this opportunity and to raise awareness about the importance of prioritizing security sector reform as a key component of the 2030 Agenda, in particular Goal 16, which calls for "peaceful and inclusive societies" as well as "effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels", including security and justice institutions. Moreover, it was noted that security sector reform support can contribute to efforts to address bottlenecks and thereby achieve broader development goals.

- It is recommended that further efforts be made to link security sector reform to the broader policy agenda of the Sustainable Development Goals, and in particular, to raise awareness of the role that security sector reform can play as an accelerator for the 2030 Agenda.

- It is recommended that multilateral organizations reflect on how to better mainstream elements of the 2030 Agenda into their security sector reform support, including through the promotion of local approaches to security sector reform and enhanced cooperation across development and security actors.

(c) In the area of prevention, there is a need to enhance reflection on how security sector reform can contribute to prevention efforts. Such action requires a better understanding of the potential role that the security sector may play in reinforcing tensions across the very population it is meant to protect. On the one hand, examining the extent to which the security sector is representative of different ethnic, religious and other groups. On the other hand, it also requires looking at the degree to which legitimate State institutions deliver security to all people, regardless of race, religion or gender.

- It is recommended that further efforts be made to reflect on how security sector reform can contribute to prevention efforts within the framework of broader policy initiatives to strengthen prevention. In particular, calls were made to identify concrete institution-building measures that can contribute to building the resilience of the security sector.

- It is recommended that multilateral organizations better integrate security sector reform into existing conflict analysis tools. Such tools should, among other issues, reflect on the role the security sector may play in contributing to the root drivers of conflict.

Cross-cutting recommendations

(d) Strengthen partnerships among multilateral organizations in support of enhanced predictability on the ground. To contribute to broader efforts to sustain peace, it is important that multilateral organizations engaged in security sector reform support can rapidly map the situation on the ground, identify gaps in support and agree on roles and responsibilities according to a shared understanding of comparative advantages. It was recognized that effective partnerships are necessary to meet those requirements. In practice, however, it was noted that such cooperation often does not take place until actors are deployed on the ground and it is too late to realign resources.

- It is recommended that multilateral organizations reflect on how to ensure early cooperation, before it is too late to realign support, which requires engaging in gap analysis to identify what is already being done by partners and what remains to be done.

- It is recommended that international coordination in the area of security sector reform move towards coordination approaches such as those that have been used in other sectors, including development.

- It is recommended that principles for bilateral and multilateral assistance to security sector reform be developed so that they are in line with broader principles of aid effectiveness.

(e) Strengthen partnerships among multilateral organizations in support of learning lessons. Empirical research is vital to better understand what is working, what is not working and what measures need to be taken to enhance the delivery of international security sector reform support on the ground. It was recognized that more efforts are required to invest in research, analysis and the development of strategic guidance. It was noted that partnerships should be strengthened among multilateral organizations with the aim of sharing experiences and good practice.

- It is recommended that more efforts be made to engage in empirically-based research and to ensure that emerging lessons are shared and discussed across multilateral organizations through dedicated meetings.

- It is recommended that a collective overview of available security sector reform-related guidance be shared among multilateral organizations.

(f) Strengthen multilateral organizations' approaches to planning for security sector reform support. It was underlined that a common challenge for multilateral organizations is to effectively integrate security sector reform into broader planning processes. In particular, planning often focuses on immediate needs without taking into account the need to plan for long-term needs. In the context of peacekeeping, another challenge identified is that, in practice, efforts are made to ensure that all main topics are addressed in assessments, which often leads to overloading mandates with competing tasks, without clear priorities. It was underlined that

effective partnerships for security sector reform support require enhanced efforts to jointly assess and prioritize needs as well as a commitment to adapting support accordingly.

- It is recommended that multilateral organizations engage where possible in joint security sector reform assessments, and that the findings from those assessments are jointly analysed and acted upon.
- It is recommended that efforts be made to identify both immediate and longer-term needs which are in line with broader national goals, and to appropriately prioritize such needs.
- It is recommended that, where obstacles to cooperation exist between multilateral organizations, such as incompatible timelines and processes, that those be addressed through established coordination mechanisms at the highest level.

(g) Identify approaches to harness necessary expertise for security sector reform support. It was underlined that while multilateral organizations have developed security sector reform-related capacities at both headquarters and in the field, many challenges remain in the ability to leverage the expertise required at the necessary moment. In particular, it was noted that with the fast-changing needs on the ground, it is no longer possible to host all necessary expertise within an organization. Moreover, the specialized experts required for different areas of security sector reform support are often not available. It was recognized that there will increasingly be a need to rely on external capacities, which can be provided through partnerships as well as the establishment of rosters.

- It is recommended that partnerships across security, development and human rights actors be strengthened to enable better sharing of expertise. For instance, development actors can contribute expertise in the broader area of public administration reform, while human rights actors can provide knowledge on root drivers of conflict related to social and political exclusion, human rights violations and discrimination. More efforts are required to connect those actors to one another and ensure that they are working towards a common goal.
- It is recommended that efforts be made to invest in the further development and usage of rosters. While rosters already exist, or are in the process of being created, there is a need to ensure that there are mechanisms for sharing information across multilateral organizations.

(h) Promote inclusive approaches to security sector reform support as called for in the 2030 Agenda and sustaining peace agenda. One of the commonalities between the 2030 Agenda and the sustaining peace agenda is that neither one will work if it is not founded on the principle of inclusivity. It was recognized that this requires inclusive approaches to security sector reform support that includes both men and women and engaging with stakeholders at both the national and local levels. More broadly, it was recognized that this also requires engaging with non-State actors, in particular customary and traditional actors. It was acknowledged that while multilateral organizations are by definition State-based, they need to find ways to overcome challenges in engaging with non-State actors.

- It is recommended that assessments examine the extent to which the security sector is representative of different ethnic, religious and other groups. This also requires looking at the degree to which legitimate State institutions deliver security to all people, regardless of race, religion or gender.

- It is recommended that multilateral organizations seek to identify approaches to engage more with non-State actors as appropriate. Many of the security threats being faced require engaging with non-State actors. Moreover, there are many customary and traditional institutions that are able to support the delivery of security to the population and continue to function, even in fragile contexts. There is therefore a need to overcome the friction between the legitimacy of traditional institutions and the legality of State-based institutions.

(i) Promote security sector reform as part of broader institution-building. It was recognized that security sector reform should be understood as an integral part of broader institution-building, which takes place on an ongoing basis in all countries. There has been an increasing tendency to focus on short-term measures, such as train-and-equip programmes, that do not build the foundations for an effective and accountable security sector. There were strong calls to link security sector reform to broader public administration reform efforts, such as public expenditure reviews, in order to contribute to the sustainability of reform efforts.

- It is recommended that support to security sector reform, as part of broader institution-building, be strengthened through dedicated support programmes across all contexts, as relevant, including peacekeeping.

- It is recommended that efforts be made to secure funding for institution-building efforts that require sustained commitment, as well as to build partnerships across security and development actors on this issue.

(j) Raise understanding among Member States about the long-term nature of security sector reform. It was recognized that security sector reform is a generational process that cannot fit into short timelines. While Member States have a responsibility to hold multilateral organizations to account for progress made, it must be recognized that room should also be given to those organizations to invest in supporting long-term nationally-driven processes, which may not always deliver immediate tangible outcomes in the short-term. A balance needs to be found between the need to strengthen accountability through enhanced monitoring and evaluation and the need to factor in the long-term nature of security sector reform.

- It is recommended that Member States recognize the long-term nature of security sector reform support and that, while enhanced monitoring and evaluation should be promoted, there is a need to also acknowledge that important longer-term results may take time to materialize.

- It is recommended that Member States support long-term approaches to security sector reform based on predictable funding, including through trust funds. Calls were also made to strengthen the capacity of the secretariat of the United Nations Inter-Agency Security Sector Reform Task Force, which plays an important coordinating role in the United Nations system.

Way ahead

14. The present outcome document will be distributed to the respective Group of Friends of security sector reform in New York and OSCE in Vienna and other multilateral organizations, including the European Union, OECD, World Bank and others. It will serve as a contribution to efforts to further anchor the security sector reform agenda in multilateral forums and to enhance the effectivity and sustainability of international support to security sector reform.

United Nations S/2017/845

Security Council

Distr.: General
6 October 2017

Original: English

Letter dated 4 October 2017 from the Chair a.i. of the Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission, I am pleased to provide a report on the results of the eighty-third session of the Council, which was held in Geneva on 3 October 2017. The full text of the conclusions adopted by the Council, together with additional documentation, is attached.* I would, however, like to highlight a few of the issues discussed during the session.

As the position of the President of the Governing Council remains vacant, Egypt agreed to preside over the eighty-third session.

During the opening plenary meeting, delegations from the Governments of Kuwait and Iraq, including a delegation from the Committee of Financial Experts, which is responsible for the oversight of Iraq's oil revenues, addressed the Council.

With the adoption of decisions 272 (2014), 273 (2015) and 274 (2016) by the Governing Council, the obligation for Iraq to deposit 5 per cent of the proceeds generated by the export sales of Iraqi petroleum and petroleum products into the United Nations Compensation Fund was postponed until 1 January 2018. As a result, no compensation payments have been made since October 2014. In the light of the three consecutive one-year postponements, the Council continued its discussions on future options for ensuring the resolution of the $4.6 billion remaining to be paid to the only outstanding claim award and for bringing the mandate of the Commission to a conclusion. That claim, submitted by the Government of the State of Kuwait on behalf of the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation, had been awarded $14.7 billion in 2000 for losses in oil production and sales as a result of damages to Kuwait's oilfield assets and represents the largest award granted by the Commission.

The Governing Council adopted decision 275 (2017) allowing the Governments of Iraq and Kuwait additional time to collaborate on options that would ensure the final payment of compensation towards the outstanding award by the end of 2021, to be considered at a special session of the Governing Council to be held on 21 November 2017.

In that regard, and as set out in the decision, the Governments of Iraq and Kuwait are to present options for the Governing Council's consideration by 14 November 2017. In the absence of the presentation of options that would bring the mandate of the Commission to a conclusion in the near term, the Council will have no alternative but to make a determination from among the options considered

* Not included in present document.

at its eighty-second session, while recognizing the extraordinary budgetary challenges Iraq continues to face.

With regard to the ongoing request by Iraq for access to the Commission's archives, the Governing Council considered the issue in the light of the letter dated 1 August 2017 sent by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq to the President of the Security Council (S/2017/721) and the statements made by the delegation of Iraq at the opening plenary session. In its consideration of the matter, the Governing Council recalled that individual claim files had been disposed of in accordance with the approved policies relating to the records of the Commission; that the limited information remaining within the Commission did not contain any details regarding the particulars of losses with respect to individual claims; that the Council's position on confidentiality resulted in the non-disclosure of the names of the individuals who had filed claims with the Commission (category A, B, C and D claims); that the Commission only awarded compensation for losses as a direct result of the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990-91 and any claims for losses outside of the period would therefore not have been compensated by the Commission; and that detailed information for all category E (corporate) and F (government) claims, which represent 77.7 per cent of the total amount awarded, had been given to Iraq. A letter will be sent by the Governing Council to Iraq in that regard.

The Governing Council adopted the report of the Committee on Administrative Matters, which met during the session and approved the Commission's budget for 2018.

As noted above, a special session will be held on 21 November 2017, and the next regular session of the Governing Council has been tentatively scheduled for 25 April 2018.

(*Signed*) Heidy **Serry**
Minister Plenipotentiary
Deputy Permanent Representative
on behalf of the Governing Council

United Nations A/72/514–S/2017/846

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
9 October 2017

Original: English

General Assembly
Seventy-second session
Agenda item 121
Revitalization of the work of the General Assembly

Security Council
Seventy-second year

Identical letters dated 5 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Estonia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit on behalf of 25 Member States[1] of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group a note on the selection process of the ninth Secretary-General of the United Nations in 2015 and 2016 (see annex). The cross-regional Group played a leading role in the negotiations on the revitalization of the General Assembly on increased transparency, inclusiveness and accountability of the process for selecting the ninth Secretary-General, and we hope that the note will serve as a reference for future selection processes.

I should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter and its annex as a document of the seventy-second session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 121, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Sven **Jürgenson**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

[1] Austria, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Hungary, Ireland, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Maldives, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Portugal, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland and Uruguay.

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Annex to the identical letters dated 5 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Estonia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council

Lessons learned on the selection and appointment of the ninth Secretary-General of the United Nations in 2015 and 2016

In 2014, the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group (ACT Group)[1] started its work to increase the transparency, inclusiveness and accountability of the process for selecting the next Secretary-General. The selection process, which had been the same for the previous 70 years, was viewed by many as outdated and not fit for purpose. Member States, parliamentarians and civil society organizations from across the globe argued that a process conducted in secret by the Security Council was no longer appropriate and would not guarantee the selection of the best possible candidate.

The ACT Group believes that the General Assembly has the right, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, resolutions 69/321 and 70/305 and other relevant decisions, to play a more active role in the selection process. In 2015 and 2016, the Group worked to help empower the Assembly and its President to engage directly with candidates; it also set expectations on the selection criteria and encouraged the Security Council towards a more inclusive and transparent approach.

The ACT Group played a leading role in the negotiations on the revitalization of the General Assembly, and the main objectives outlined in its position papers from March 2015 and February 2016,[2] from declared candidatures to open hearings, became integral parts of Assembly resolutions 69/321 and 70/305.

The members of the ACT Group are convinced that the standards achieved and the principles set out in the resolutions on the revitalization of the General Assembly should be applied and strengthened in all future selection processes. To that end, the Group suggests the proposals set out below.

General Assembly and the President of the General Assembly

- The General Assembly, through its Member States and its President, must continue to play a key role in all future selection processes. The ACT Group recalls that it is the Assembly that is, upon the recommendation of the Security Council, responsible for appointing the Secretary-General. It is essential that the Secretary-General enjoy the widest possible support among the membership.
- For the ACT Group, it is crucial that the role of the General Assembly in the selection process be consolidated. The role of the President of the General Assembly in the process is also critical; the Group encourages the proactive engagement by the President of the General Assembly across the entire selection cycle.
- In the view of the ACT Group, negotiations on outstanding issues with regard to the role of the General Assembly must be carried through without delay in

[1] The Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group is a cross-regional group of 25 States that includes: Austria, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Hungary, Ireland, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Maldives, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Portugal, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland and Uruguay.

[2] See http://www.un.estemb.org/news/aid-1348 and http://www.un.estemb.org/news/aid-1349.

the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Revitalization of the Work of the General Assembly, notwithstanding the actual selection cycle.

Selection timeline and the nomination of candidates

- Providing a structured time frame for the selection process greatly enhanced the selection process in 2015 and 2016. The ACT Group believes that a deadline for the presentation of candidatures, as well as a timeline for the overall process, such as that set out below, should be followed for future processes, while bearing in mind that ultimately the best possible candidate should be appointed.
- The ACT Group proposes an indicative timeline for appointment of future Secretaries-General, as follows:
    - October of the year preceding appointment: joint letter from the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council to all United Nations Member States encouraging the nomination of qualified candidates;
    - 1 April of the appointment year: deadline for the submission of candidatures;
    - End of June of the appointment year: deadline for the completion of General Assembly hearings with all candidates;
    - 1 October: deadline for the Security Council recommendation and the resolution from the General Assembly regarding the appointment of the Secretary-General.
- The ACT Group encourages the early presentation of qualified candidates, as late nominations may not allow sufficient time for full evaluation.
- The ACT Group welcomes the value added by various stakeholders, including civil society, in searching for suitable candidates on their own initiative as an input for consideration by Member States.
- The ACT Group calls on all candidates to participate fully in the overall selection process.

Selection process and informal meetings with the candidates

- The General Assembly should play an active role in the selection process, in accordance with the Charter, resolutions 69/321 and 70/305 and other relevant decisions.
- For the ACT Group, the informal dialogues and meetings with the candidates are a key part of the selection process. It expects all candidates to take part in the meetings and to circulate a document outlining their policy priorities in advance. The fact that the President of the General Assembly insisted during the latest selection on following the same procedure for all of the candidates prevented any attempts at selecting a candidate from outside the list.
- The ACT Group sees possibilities to further improve the format of the informal dialogues by making them more interactive, for example by increasing the time available to candidates to provide responses and by having the President of the General Assembly play an active role as moderator, including by seeking to avoid the duplication of questions.
- The ACT Group calls for ensuring that civil society can continue to actively participate in the informal dialogues and meetings with the candidates, and

also encourages candidates themselves to interact with civil society organizations. Furthermore, the Group encourages civil society to continue working towards improving the selection process of the Secretary-General and continue its efforts towards ensuring that the best possible candidate will be appointed, for example by looking into the practice of existing panels of highly regarded individuals who review candidates and their qualifications for similar senior positions, in order to assist Member States in their assessments.

- The ACT Group encourages the consideration of possible ways to assess the level of General Assembly support for the candidates throughout the process.

Interaction between the Security Council and the General Assembly

- The ACT Group notes the collaboration between the General Assembly and the Security Council in launching the process and circulating information on the nominated candidates. The Group also welcomes the holding of monthly meetings between the Presidents of the General Assembly and the Security Council and values the summaries shared with all Member States.

- Nevertheless, the ACT Group believes that the interaction between the Security Council and the General Assembly needs to be improved to live up to the expectations of the membership and the new standard of openness and transparency.

- In that regard, the ACT Group encourages the Security Council to review its working methods, building on the discussions held among Council members during the latest selection process. For example, the Group believes that collective discussions within the Council on the merit, skills or experience of individual candidates would enhance Council decision-making.

- The ACT Group recalls the collective responsibility of the Security Council to reach consensus on a recommendation to the General Assembly for the appointment of the Secretary-General. In that regard, the Group believes the use of colour-coded ballots during straw polling should be discouraged and the equal rights and role of all Council members in the process should be upheld.

- The ACT Group calls for regular public briefings by the Security Council on developments in the nomination process and open communication of straw poll results.

Identification, appointment and reappointment

- In identifying the best candidate for appointment, personal qualification is the most important criterion for appointment, while due regard should be given to fair geographical distribution through rotation and to gender balance.

- The ACT Group recalls the prerogative of the General Assembly to draft the resolution for the appointment of the Secretary-General and proposes that the draft resolution be finalized at the Assembly's earliest convenience to ensure that the process is not linked to any individual candidate.

- The ACT Group welcomes the informal meeting of the General Assembly with the Secretary-General-designate convened by the President of the General Assembly in November 2016, with the aim of assisting him in his preparation for office, and encourages similar meetings in the framework of future processes of appointment of Secretaries-General.

- The ACT Group believes that all of the provisions in the present document regarding the selection and appointment of the Secretary-General should apply

in the event that an incumbent Secretary-General seeks or is proposed for reappointment.

- In line with the provisions of the Charter and the oath taken by the Secretary-General, the ACT Group believes that the Secretary-General should exercise complete independence in the selection of senior officials, with due regard to geographical and gender balance. Recalling General Assembly resolution 70/305, the appointment process of the executive heads and the Senior Management Group of the Organization should be inclusive and transparent and there should not be a monopoly on senior posts by nationals of any State or group of States.

- In that regard, the ACT Group proposes that the principles governing the appointment of executive heads and the Senior Management Group of the organization be formally established.

- The ACT Group believes that the oath of office of the Secretary-General should be updated.

Term in office

- The ACT Group would like to continue the discussion and see an informed decision taken within the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Revitalization of the Work of the General Assembly by all States on the term of office of the Secretary-General, including the proposal to establish a single, non-renewable term for future Secretaries-General.

United Nations A/72/527–S/2017/847

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
11 October 2017
English
Original: Arabic

General Assembly
Seventy-second session
Agenda item 37
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Seventy-second year

Identical letters dated 9 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I write with reference to the reports circulated by certain Israeli parties, to the effect that Lieutenant Colonel Yahya al-Husayni of the Directorate of Intelligence is connected with Hizbullah, and that the latter is using his position in the Lebanese Army for so-called terrorist activities on the border. That information is completely mistaken. Its sole purpose is to tarnish the image of the Lebanese Army and to portray it as the party responsible for violating international law and the provisions of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006), in order to help Israel in its ongoing endeavour to justify its violations of Lebanese sovereignty by air, sea and land.

My country's Government respects its obligations under the relevant international resolutions. On its behalf, I call on the Security Council to condemn those claims and allegations in the strongest terms possible, and to prevail on Israel to stop violating Lebanese sovereignty by air, sea and land and fulfil all of its obligations under Security Council resolution 1701 (2006).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter issued as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 37, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Nawaf **Salam**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

17-17939 (E) 121017 161017

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United Nations A/72/526–S/2017/848

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
10 October 2017

Original: English

General Assembly
Seventy-second session
Agenda item 34 (a)
Prevention of armed conflict: prevention of armed conflict

Security Council
Seventy-second year

Letter dated 6 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to share with you some thoughts as a follow-up to the meeting that the Security Council held on 4 October 2017 on the Syrian chemical file. The discussion once again proved that all Council members firmly condemn the use of chemical weapons wherever and by whomsoever and believe that those responsible should be identified and held to account. This was exactly the purpose of the establishment of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) fact-finding mission and the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism.

The Council members unanimously supported an independent, impartial, professional and objective investigation of the alleged chemical incidents in Syria. On the other hand, some legitimate questions were raised by a number of delegations, in particular with regard to the episode in Khan Shaykhun (Idlib governorate) on 4 April 2017.

From April to June 2017, the fact-finding mission conducted an investigation of the chemical incident in Khan Shaykhun without visiting the site. The fact-finding mission did not thoroughly observe the basic principle of chain of custody and drew its conclusions by interviewing some witnesses whose presence at the site on 4 April was never credibly confirmed. The mission preferred not to go to Sha'irat airbase, where, as was repeatedly claimed, sarin allegedly used in Khan Shaykhun was stored. We were informed in the course of the Security Council meeting that there was a chance for the mission to visit the site of the incident in Khan Shaykhun. All security guarantees were given by the armed groups in control of the site, but the mission did not seize that opportunity for unexplained reasons.

The Joint Investigative Mechanism now has a chance to avoid repeating the fact-finding mission's flaws as it is preparing to send its team to Sha'irat airbase at the invitation of the Syrian Government. We believe it to be in our common interest that this visit be productive in terms of leading to the determination of accurate facts and data. One of the primary purposes of such an inspection should be to determine whether sarin was stored at the airbase.

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No less important for the Joint Investigative Mechanism is to make all possible efforts to visit the site of the incident in Khan Shaykhun pending the security situation, the solution to which, as we know now, could be found.

Looking forward to the final report of the Joint Investigative Mechanism, we express the hope that the Mechanism will be able to strictly adhere to appropriate methodology and avoid hasty and groundless conclusions not supported by robust evidence, as well as factual, detailed and comprehensive justification. All possible leads and scenarios should be meticulously examined. We expect that all necessary information will be provided in the report on who collected the evidence and where and by what means. It is crucial that the principle of presumption of innocence be observed in the course of investigation. There should be no place for any kind of prejudgment.

Please find enclosed herewith a non-paper with some Russian assessments of the fact-finding mission investigation (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 34 (a), and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Vassily **Nebenzia**

Annex to the letter dated 6 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Non-paper

The Joint Investigative Mechanism is studying the circumstances of two chemical incidents in Syria to identify their perpetrators. One of them occurred in Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017. First, we find it necessary to point to several setbacks in the activity of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) fact-finding mission to help the Mechanism to avoid the latter's mistakes.

The fundamental flaw in the work of the fact-finding mission was non-compliance with the key principle of chain of custody to preserve the integrity of material evidence. There is no certainty that the material evidence received by OPCW personnel has any relation to Khan Shaykhun. Witnesses were picked out mostly by opposition groups and related organizations.

Another serious flaw was that the fact-finding mission carried out its investigation remotely, without visiting the place of the incident. In particular, there was no justification for the refusal to visit Khan Shaykhun and the Sha'irat airbase, where sarin or a sarin-like substance used in Khan Shaykhun was being stored as some alleged. The Syrian authorities guaranteed free and safe access to this facility for OPCW personnel. The security situation, as we know now, also allowed a visit to Khan Shaykhun.

The fact-finding mission established that sarin or a sarin-like substance was used, but no evidence was provided that an aerial bomb was dropped there. Not a single fragment can be seen on the numerous photos and videos. At the same time, something similar to a compressed metallic pipe can be noticed in the crater, but there is no trace of an aerial bomb.

The work done by the fact-finding mission cannot be considered as solid and complete. The Joint Investigative Mechanism should take into account the findings from the mission's report but thoroughly double-check them. Many other questions to the mission on its methods of work, the way evidence was collected, as well as ignored, and conclusions that were made by it, remained unanswered or unattended to. The Mechanism will have to rely on its own investigation and sources of information and collect additional evidence as stipulated in paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 2235 (2015).

We hope that some recommendations will help the Joint Investigative Mechanism to conduct a comprehensive, professional and objective investigation to identify those responsible on the basis of undeniable proofs:

1. There is a need to consider all leads without exception, including that of a staged character of the chemical incident.

2. The closest attention should be paid to clarifying the key question of how sarin or a sarin-like substance was used. Without such clarification, it is impossible to identify those responsible.

3. As provided for in paragraph 7 of resolution 2235 (2015), the Joint Investigative Mechanism should fill the gaps which became evident as the fact-finding mission concluded its investigation. To that end the Mechanism experts should visit the Sha'irat airbase and take and analyse samples, without which it will not be possible to identify whether sarin was stored there.

4. According to available information, the crater was paved with asphalt in mid-April, which looked like a deliberate elimination of the material evidence. The Mechanism experts should carefully examine the existing photos and videos to identify the nature of the crater.

Russian specialists came to the conclusion that the size and geometrical form of the crater, as well as the direction of asphalt curves around it (inward, not outward), indicate that a container with sarin or a sarin-like substance was detonated right on the surface. Most likely an improvised explosive device was placed on the asphalt, while the container with sarin or a sarin-like substance held no more than one or two litres of poison gas.

The Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor T. Postol and the former United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission employee S. Ritter wrote articles on the incident, which are worth being looked at.

5. While examining the theory of an air bomb explosion, the Mechanism experts will have to explain the absence of its fragments and remains on the photos and videos.

6. What specifically needs to be substantiated is why the children on the photos, who allegedly suffered from the incident, have dilated eye pupils, while after contact with sarin they were supposed to be contracted.

It is easy to find many other mismatches, as mentioned in particular by the non-governmental organization Swedish Doctors for Human Rights.

Thus, there are serious grounds to assume that much of the evidence was fabricated and some hastily removed to hamper credible investigation.

7. To identify those involved, there is a need to gather information from alternative sources using various investigative skills, in particular in the fields of forensics and counter-terrorism.

8. We believe that the Joint Investigative Mechanism should carefully look at the information on preparations for chemical attacks by terrorists which Syria keeps sending to the Security Council on a regular basis. All possible leads should be considered to determine how toxic chemicals and precursors go to Syria, as well as how, where and by whom they are synthesized.

United Nations S/2017/849*

Security Council

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11 October 2017
English
Original: Russian

Letter dated 6 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith information bulletins from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic for the period 4 to 6 October 2017 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would arrange for the present letter and its annex to be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) V. **Nebenzia**

* Reissued for technical reasons on 20 October 2017.

17-17931* (E) 201017 201017

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Annex to the letter dated 6 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (4 October 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

The Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported five incidents of gunfire in the following governorates: four in Damascus and one in Dar'a.

The Turkish representative office has reported seven violations in the following governorates: two in Aleppo, one in Idlib, one in Homs and three in Damascus.

Most incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides has carried out two humanitarian operations in the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic:

2 tons of food was delivered to the local population in Haysah, Homs governorate;

and 2.9 tons of food was delivered to the local population in Humaymah Kabir, Aleppo governorate.

In total, 1,635 humanitarian operations have been carried out. The total weight of humanitarian cargo delivered is 2,209 tons.

Over the past 24 hours, medical assistance has been provided to 246 residents.

In total, medical assistance has been provided to 58,358 residents.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, no ceasefire regime agreements have been signed with populated areas.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process remains unchanged at 2,241.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 234.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (5 October 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

The Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported five incidents of gunfire in the following governorates: two in Damascus, one in Dar'a and two in Aleppo.

The Turkish representative office has reported two violations in Damascus governorate.

Most incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and ISIL.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides has not carried out any humanitarian operations.

In total, 1,635 humanitarian operations have been carried out. The total weight of humanitarian cargo delivered is 2,209 tons.

Three humanitarian convoys were sent by the United Nations. Food products, medicines and household supplies, with a total weight of 385 tons, were delivered to Khaimi and Kahil in Dar'a governorate and Hulah in Homs governorate.

Over the past 24 hours, medical assistance has been provided to 74 residents.

In total, medical assistance has been provided to 58,432 residents.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, one ceasefire agreement has been signed with Kissin in Homs governorate.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process has increased to 2,242.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 234.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (6 October 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

The Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported six incidents of gunfire in the following governorates: two in Damascus, two in Dar'a and two in Aleppo.

The Turkish representative office has reported one violation in Damascus governorate.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and ISIL.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out three humanitarian operations:

2 tons of food was delivered to the local population in Ma'arrin, Hama governorate.

2.9 tons of food was delivered to the local population in Rasm al-Falih, Aleppo governorate.

and 2.2 tons of food was delivered to the local population in Khirbat al-Shabab, Damascus governorate.

In total, 1,638 humanitarian operations have been carried out. The total weight of humanitarian cargo delivered is 2,219.3 tons.

Over the past 24 hours, medical assistance has been provided to 408 residents.

In total, medical assistance has been provided to 58,840 residents.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, no ceasefire regime agreements have been signed with populated areas.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process remains unchanged at 2,242.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 234.

About 5,000 Syrian citizens, including 3,000 children, have returned to Talfita (eastern Qalamun, Damascus governorate).

United Nations S/2017/85

Security Council

Distr.: General
9 October 2017
English
Original: French

Letter dated 3 October 2017 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 2367 (2017), adopted on 14 July 2017, in which the Security Council "calls upon the Secretary-General to conduct, by 15 October 2017, an independent, external assessment of the structure and staffing of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, related resources, priorities, and areas in which it has comparative advantages and synergies with other United Nations entities, in order to ensure that the Mission and United Nations country team are configured to most appropriately and efficiently fulfil mandated tasks".

The assessment by the external review team is underway. However, the lead time required for identification and recruitment of the team members, together with other preparations, have significantly reduced the period of time available for the actual assessment and the completion of the report. During its initial consultations, prior to its current visit to Iraq, the external review team expressed concern that the deadline of 15 October 2017 would present a serious challenge for the conduct of the assessment of the Mission, given the complexity of the task. I share this concern and would therefore like to recommend an extension of the deadline for the completion of the mandated assessment to 15 November 2017.

I should be grateful if you could bring the present letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) António **Guterres**

17-17740 (E) 101017 101017

Please recycle

United Nations S/2017/851

Security Council

Distr.: General
9 October 2017
English
Original: French

Letter dated 6 October 2017 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 3 October 2017 (S/2017/850), referring to paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 2367 (2017), in which the Council called upon you to conduct, by 15 October 2017, an independent, external assessment of the structure and staffing of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

The members of the Security Council have taken note of the recommendation in your letter that the deadline for the completion of the mandated assessment should be extended, and they look forward to the submission of the report by 15 November 2017.

(*Signed*) François **Delattre**
President of the Security Council

17-17741 (E) 101017 101017

Please recycle

United Nations A/C.3/72/10–S/2017/852

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
11 October 2017

Original: English

General Assembly
Seventy-second session
Third Committee
Agenda item 72 (c)
Promotion and protection of human rights: human rights situations and reports of special rapporteurs and representatives

Security Council
Seventy-second year

Letter dated 9 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine of 3 October 2017, regarding the intention of the Russian Federation to conscript to military service on the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (see annex).

I would appreciate your kind assistance in having the present letter and its annex distributed as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 72 (c), and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Volodymyr **Yelchenko**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

17-17968 (E) 181017

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 9 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine regarding the intention of the Russian Federation to conscript to military service on the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine expresses its strong protest to the intention of the Russian Federation to hold a conscription to military service on the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine).

We reiterate, that the UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/71/205 of December 19, 2016, "Situation of human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine)" confirmed the fact of illegal occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol by the Russian Federation and urged the Russian Federation to fulfill its obligations under the international humanitarian law, international human rights mechanisms, and other legal instruments to which it is a party.

We bring attention to the fact that under the international humanitarian law the occupying state is prohibited to compel protected persons to serve in its armed or auxiliary forces, as well as it is prohibited to exert pressure and use propaganda campaign to enlist voluntarily.

The thematic report of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights "Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine)" published on September 25, 2017, in pursuance of UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/71/205, states the facts of persecutions by the occupying Russian authorities of Crimea residents for their refusal to serve in the Russian army. We have to state another brutal violation by the Russian Federation of its international obligations.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine demands the Russian Federation to cancel the conscription for military service on the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine), to ensure its strict observance of international obligations as occupying state, and to fully implement UN General Assembly resolutions A/RES/68/262 of March 27, 2014, "Territorial integrity of Ukraine" and A/RES/71/205 of December 19, 2016, "Situation of human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine)".

United Nations A/72/587–S/2017/852

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
11 October 2017

Original: English

General Assembly
Seventy-second session
Agenda item 72 (c)
Promotion and protection of human rights: human rights situations and reports of special rapporteurs and representatives

Security Council
Seventy-second year

Letter dated 9 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General*

I have the honour to enclose herewith the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine of 3 October 2017, regarding the intention of the Russian Federation to conscript to military service on the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (see annex).

I would appreciate your kind assistance in having the present letter and its annex distributed as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 72 (c), and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Volodymyr **Yelchenko**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* Reissued for technical reasons on 8 November 2017; previously issued under the symbol A/C.3/72/10-S/2017/852.

17-17968* (E) 091117

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 9 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine regarding the intention of the Russian Federation to conscript to military service on the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine expresses its strong protest to the intention of the Russian Federation to hold a conscription to military service on the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine).

We reiterate, that the UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/71/205 of December 19, 2016, "Situation of human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine)" confirmed the fact of illegal occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol by the Russian Federation and urged the Russian Federation to fulfill its obligations under the international humanitarian law, international human rights mechanisms, and other legal instruments to which it is a party.

We bring attention to the fact that under the international humanitarian law the occupying state is prohibited to compel protected persons to serve in its armed or auxiliary forces, as well as it is prohibited to exert pressure and use propaganda campaign to enlist voluntarily.

The thematic report of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights "Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine)" published on September 25, 2017, in pursuance of UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/71/205, states the facts of persecutions by the occupying Russian authorities of Crimea residents for their refusal to serve in the Russian army. We have to state another brutal violation by the Russian Federation of its international obligations.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine demands the Russian Federation to cancel the conscription for military service on the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine), to ensure its strict observance of international obligations as occupying state, and to fully implement UN General Assembly resolutions A/RES/68/262 of March 27, 2014, "Territorial integrity of Ukraine" and A/RES/71/205 of December 19, 2016, "Situation of human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine)".

United Nations A/72/529–S/2017/853

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
12 October 2017

Original: English

General Assembly
Seventy-second session
Agenda item 44
Question of Cyprus

Security Council
Seventy-second year

Letter dated 10 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 9 October 2017, addressed to you by the Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Mehmet Dânâ (see annex).

I would be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 44, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Feridun H. **Sinirlioğlu**
Permanent Representative

17-18031 (E) 191017

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 10 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

9 October 2017

Upon instructions from my Government, I am writing in response to the letters dated 1 September 2017 (A/71/1033-S/2017/749) and 2 October 2017 (A/72/506-S/2017/828) addressed to you by the Greek Cypriot representative in New York and circulated as documents of the General Assembly and of the Security Council, which yet again contain false assertions similar to those made in his previous letters. In order to set the record straight, I would like to bring the following to your kind attention.

At the outset, regarding the claims of so-called "infringements of international air traffic regulations" and "violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey", I wish, once again, to reiterate that flights within the sovereign airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus take place with the full knowledge and consent of the relevant authorities of the State, over which the Greek Cypriot administration in South Cyprus has no jurisdiction or right of say whatsoever. The civil aviation authority of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is the sole competent authority to provide air traffic and aeronautical information services within its own national airspace. As for the false assertion regarding "illegally issued" notices to airmen, it must be underlined that activities within the Ercan advisory airspace that require notices to airmen are carried out by the relevant authorities of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in accordance with article 3 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention).

Similarly, the claims in the letters regarding Turkish Cypriot ports are also baseless, given the fact that the Greek Cypriot administration has no jurisdiction or right of say over Northern Cyprus. Furthermore, these claims ignore the present realities on the ground, namely, the existence of two independent self-governing States on the island of Cyprus, each exercising sovereignty and jurisdiction within its respective territory.

As to the repeated false allegations regarding Ercan Airport in the North, it should once again be underlined that the technologically up-to-date Ercan area control centre and airport in North Cyprus have been providing regular, reliable and safe air traffic services since the Greek Cypriot refusal in 1977 to provide air traffic services in the northern part of the island, in line with its isolation policy that has been imposed on the Turkish Cypriot people. Ever since, all flights within the sovereign airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus have taken place with the full knowledge and permission of the Civil Aviation Department of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, over which the Greek Cypriot administration in South Cyprus has no jurisdiction or control. Furthermore, I would like to stress that the allegation regarding the interference of radio frequencies is also totally baseless.

Moreover, the isolation imposed on the Turkish Cypriots, which the Greek Cypriot side attempts to perpetuate by encouraging the international community to deem all air and sea ports in Northern Cyprus "illegal", is in complete contravention of international law, as well as of the call made by the then Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, in his report to the Security Council dated 28 May 2004 (S/2004/437), in which he clearly stated, "I would hope they [members of the Security Council] can give a strong lead to all States to cooperate both bilaterally and in international bodies to eliminate unnecessary restrictions and barriers that have the effect of

isolating the Turkish Cypriots and impeding their development, deeming such a move as consistent with Security Council resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984)".

The legislation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on aeronautical safety meets all standards and recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organization, providing safe and swift navigation of aircraft landing at or taking off from Ercan Airport and using airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. All airports in Northern Cyprus are in full conformity with international standards, and necessary investments have been made to keep up with the developing technology. The number of air traffic controllers has been increased in accordance with the increasing number of flights over the years, and the Ercan area control centre is in regular and close cooperation with the Ankara area control centre in order to ensure the safe conduct of all flights in the region. In 2016 alone, the number of passengers who used Ercan Airport amounted to 3,628,887, while this number is expected to be around 3,900,000 in 2017. Moreover, in 2016, 27,109 planes used Ercan Airport for arrival and departure, and 210,789 planes used the Ercan advisory airspace; these numbers are expected to be around 28,080 and 225,000, respectively, in 2017. In that regard, it must also be stressed that the Turkish Cypriot side is committed to upholding the highest standards in the field of air navigation safety in full conformity with the Chicago Convention of 1944, and that it is ready to cooperate with the Greek Cypriot authorities on this very important issue.

Availing myself of the present opportunity, I would like to call upon the Greek Cypriot side to discontinue such counterproductive and outdated rhetoric. Moreover, the Greek Cypriot administration should once again be reminded that its counterpart is, and has always been, the Turkish Cypriot side, not Turkey.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 44, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mehmet **Dânâ**
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

United Nations S/2017/854

Security Council

Distr.: General
19 October 2017
English
Original: Russian

Letter dated 11 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith information bulletins from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic for the period 7-10 October 2017 (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) V. **Nebenzia**

17-18479 (E) 191017 231017

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 11 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (7 October 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

The Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported five incidents of gunfire in the following governorates: two in Aleppo, one in Damascus, one in Hama and one in Homs.

The Turkish representative office has reported fours violations: three in Damascus Governorate and one in Idlib Governorate.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has not carried out any humanitarian operations.

Over the past 24 hours, medical assistance has been provided to three residents.

In total, medical assistance has been provided to 58,843 residents.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, two ceasefire regime agreements have been signed with Dar al-Kabirah in Homs Governorate and Khirbat al-Shabab in Rif Dimashq Governorate.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process has increased to 2,244.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime have continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs and Qunaytirah Governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 234.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (8 October 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

The Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported six incidents of gunfire in the following governorates: two in Aleppo, two in Damascus, one in Dar'a and one in Homs.

The Turkish representative office has reported one violation in Damascus Governorate.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and ISIL.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out one humanitarian operation in Khan Unaybah, Qunaytirah Governorate, delivering a total of 2 tons of food products to the local population.

In total, 1,639 humanitarian operations have been carried out. The total weight of humanitarian cargo delivered is 2,221.3 tons.

Over the past 24 hours, medical assistance has been provided to 86 residents.

In total, medical assistance has been provided to 58,929 residents.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, no ceasefire agreements have been signed with populated areas.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process is unchanged — it is still 2,244.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime have continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs and Qunaytirah Governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 234.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (9 October 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

The Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported eight incidents of gunfire in the following governorates: three in Aleppo, three in Homs, one in Damascus and one in Dar'a.

The Turkish representative office has reported one violation in Damascus Governorate.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and ISIL.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out one medical humanitarian operation in the Mogambo military hospital in Aleppo city. Care was provided to 71 combatants of the armed forces of the Syrian Arab Republic.

In total, 1,640 humanitarian operations have been carried out. The total weight of humanitarian cargo delivered is 2,221.3 tons.

Over the past 24 hours, medical assistance has been provided to 126 residents.

In total, medical assistance has been provided to 59,055 residents.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, four ceasefire regime agreements have been signed with Khirbat al-Jami', Mazra'at al-Shah and Amirah in Hama Governorate, and with Ghantu in Homs Governorate.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process has increased to 2,248.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime have continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs and Qunaytirah Governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 234.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (10 October 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported 12 incidents of gunfire in the following governorates: 7 in Homs, 4 in Aleppo and 1 in Dar'a.

The Turkish representative office has reported one violation in Dar'a Governorate.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and ISIL.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

The United Nations has dispatched two humanitarian convoys, delivering a total of 119 tons of food products and household goods to Khajmi and Tayyibah.

Over the past 24 hours, medical assistance has been provided to five residents.

In total, medical assistance has been provided to 59,060 residents.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, no ceasefire agreements have been signed with populated areas.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process is unchanged — it is still 2,248.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime have continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs and Qunaytirah Governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 234.